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The true citizen upholds the social order, through his morality and uprightness, the true citizen 
personifies and represents the desirable attributes of a society. The true citizen is for example a 
hard-working, religious, austere male, as the farmer in Grant Wood’s iconic painting “American 
Gothic”. 
This normative idea of a true citizen, however, requires its counterpart to sustain itself, the 
antagonistic idea of the untrue, threatening citizen. Opposing the positive attributes of a true 
citizen to those of untrue citizens makes them stand out and reinforces their social value. Much 
like in dualist thinking in general (Marková, 2003), the differentiation between antagonistic 
category stereotypes affirms and highlights the positive nature of the desirable attributes, and the 
negative nature of the undesirable attributes. A hard-working person is seen as all the more 
hardworking when compared to a lazy, unmotivated hipster. 
I want to highlight in this talk the dualist representations of social categories and groups 
to which I refer as “intergroup antagonisms”. I believe that such intergroup antagonisms play a 
fundamental role in lay thinking in general, and in legitimizing of political thought and action in 
particular. They provide normative and counter-normative models of behaviour, thereby showing 
the kind of behaviours and attitudes that are likely to be rewarded in society and those that are 
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likely to be scoffed upon and eventually sanctioned. As normative signposts, intergroup 
antagonisms orient people’s thinking towards socially acceptable and legitimate ways, and the 
opposition between the true and the untrue citizen is but one example of such a generic 
opposition. 
The reason why I talk about intergroup antagonisms in a social representations conference 
is that I believe that they are a key category of social representations – widespread, organizing 
social behaviour and legitimizing political action. They combine the fundamentally dualist nature 
of social representations with social processes derived from intergroup relations theories, in 
particular social identity theory. They highlight the importance of stereotype content in 
intergroup relations, but emphasize at the same time that – as any social representation – they are 
not consensual. Rather, there is an ongoing struggle around the prevalence and meaning of 
intergroup antagonisms in the social and the political spheres, along with attempts by political 
pressure groups to impose certain antagonisms over others. 
The public legitimacy of social order and of existing power relationships hinges upon the 
ideological values that uphold a social order (Staerklé, 2013). A stable and legitimate social order 
is based on dominant, hegemonic representations which are disseminated in society with the 
corresponding intergroup antagonisms. Indeed, hegemonic principles, values and ideologies 
underlying social order become objectified with intergroup antagonisms such that abstract values 
such as democracy, self-control, morality, self-reliance, and intergroup tolerance become 
associated with social categories, thereby putting flesh on the bare bones of values. In the 
following, I will exemplify some of the processes implied by intergroup antagonisms, starting 
with the opposition between democratic and nondemocratic groups. 
 
DEMOCRATIC VS. NONDEMOCRATIC GROUPS  
 
The opposition between democratic and nondemocratic groups has a long history in Western 
thinking. Edward Said, in his landmark book Orientalism (1978, p. 7), describes “Orientalism 
[as] a collective notion identifying ‘us’ Europeans as against all ‘those’ non-Europeans…” and 
as” the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European 
peoples and cultures”. The intergroup antagonism between democratic and nondemocratic – or 
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between Western and non-Western countries – was, and to some extent still is, at the very heart 
of Western worldviews. According to this intergroup antagonism, savage, emotional, 
uncontrolled masses in the East are opposed to civilised, rational, and controlled citizens in the 
West. While such views were hardly contested during the heydays of Western colonialism, a 
series of studies has examined to what extent remnants of such thinking could still be found in a 
contemporary Western society, Switzerland, a country without a colonial past. 
In a first series of studies (Staerklé, Clémence & Doise, 1998) we examined lay theories 
about the relationship between a country’s government and its citizenry. We hypothesised that 
participants would expect a stereotypically democratic citizenry to live in a democratic country, 
and a nondemocratic citizenry in a nondemocratic country. If we find this association, it not only 
means that people follow the Enlightenment saying that “The population gets the government it 
deserves”, but that the antagonism between Western-democratic and non-Western nondemocratic 
countries is anchored in representations of both governments and national populations, thereby 
reinforcing the antagonism between the West and the East. 
In these experiments, participants read a short description of a democratic or a 
nondemocratic country: “Think of a country where political, economic and military power is held 
by different [the same] persons, a country where the government takes its decisions by consulting 
the population and its representatives [without consulting neither the population nor its 
representatives]”. In addition, they are informed about two attributes stereotypically associated 
with [non-]democratic citizenry: “Think of a country in which the inhabitants are quite orderly 
[disorderly] and resolve their conflicts often by discussion [clashes]”.  Participants then wrote 
down names of countries that matched the description, and indicated the extent to which they 
thought various human rights (e.g., freedom of expression, of religion, of assembly) were 
respected in the country. 
The results showed that human rights respect was perceived as highest in democratic-
orderly conditions, whereas it was massively lower in democratic-disorderly contexts. In non-
democratic contexts, human rights respect was still lower, and population attributes no longer 
mattered. Other findings demonstrated that in democratic-orderly contexts, citizens are seen as 
being more strongly opposed to human rights violations than in the other three contexts and 
therefore more politically active. 
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These findings suggest that the perceived human rights respect not only depends on the 
type of government people think of when representing the human rights situation in countries 
around the world, but also on the stereotypes associated with democratic and nondemocratic 
populations. Democratic citizens living in a Western country are seen as being at least in partial 
control of the political fate of their country and as strong enough to be able to speak up against 
potential human rights violations committed by their government. In non-democratic contexts, 
however, national populations are seen as weak and passive, unable to protest against the 
violations. Thereby, people may implicitly engage in a blaming the victim strategy: “Human 
rights violations occur because those people do not speak up against the government”. 
 
STEREOTYPE CONTENT AND ANTAGONISTIC INTERGROUP RELATIONS   
 
In order to have a more direct measure of stereotype content associated with democratic and non-
democratic groups, another experimental study carried with young people in Switzerland asked 
one half of participants to write down attributes they associate with democratic groups, while the 
other half wrote down attributes associated with non-democratic groups (see Staerklé, 2005). 
Table 1 presents the proportion of these terms spontaneously used to describe democratic and 
non-democratic groups. 
 
Table 1. Stereotypical attributes spontaneously associated with democratic and non-democratic groups 
Democratic Non-Democratic 
Free (60%) Submissive (100%) 
Independent (32%) Unhappy (28%) 
Democratic (29%) Powerless (24%) 
Open-minded (23%) Not free (20%) 
Egalitarian (18%) Poor (20%) 
Responsible (18%) Dependent (17%) 
Participating (18%) Manipulated (15%) 
Happy (14%) Without rights (15%) 
Note: Adapted from Staerklé (2005) 
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Democratic populations are represented mostly as “free”, “independent”, “democratic” 
(used as a personality attribute), and to a lesser extent as “open-minded”, “egalitarian”, 
“responsible”, “participating” and “happy”. These attributes reflect the normative conception of a 
liberal democracy, with individual freedom and responsibility, tolerance and participation as key 
organising principles. These terms are the exact mirror image of the attributes making up the 
nondemocratic representation. A full 100% of participants in the relevant conditions associated 
“submissive” and closely related terms to nondemocratic populations, followed by “unhappy”, 
“powerless”, “not free”, “poor”, “dependent”, “manipulated” and “without rights”. Many of these 
terms are negatively formulated inversions of the democratic representation, thereby 
underscoring the antagonistic nature of this dual intergroup representation. A common, 
underlying theme of these dualist representations is the opposition between agency vs. lack of 
agency, that is, the capacity attributed to democratic populations to take their destiny in their own 
hands. One can surmise that the power attributed to democratic populations to exert control over 
their rulers goes beyond the strictly political sphere to cover more inclusive spheres of social life; 
being free and independent, for example, refers more generally to an individualistic and liberal 
way of life. 
We cannot exclude that this liberal-democratic view of western and non-western countries 
reflects to some extent the normative environment of Switzerland where these studies have been 
carried out. Switzerland has indeed a strong liberal tradition (its political system was built in the 
19
th
 century on the basis of the American two-chamber system) which may explain why 
references to other (e.g., conservative, social-democratic or republican) normative models of 
democracy are virtually absent.  
Nevertheless, through these attributes, participants implicitly express and affirm the key 
values that organise Western liberal democracies. They view democratic populations as 
conforming to liberal values of self-reliance and independence, while constructing an 
antagonistic mirror image of remote and unfamiliar populations on the basis of the colonialist 
principle that “they are not like us”. More generally, social and ideological values such as 
discipline, work ethic or self-control implicitly incorporate, on the one hand, normative 
stereotypes of groups constructed to conform to key values and, on the other hand, counter-
normative stereotypes of groups who are thought to violate these same values. This antagonistic 
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process highlights the legitimising role of such values that is reinforced when value conformity is 
associated with high status groups (e.g., responsible and hard-working managers), and perceived 
non-respect is associated with low status groups (e.g., the irresponsible and lazy poor). 
 
THE CASE OF SELF-CONTROL  
 
Individualism and its central component self-control are prime examples of values which are 
expressed, communicated and asserted with antagonistic stereotypes (Joffe & Staerklé, 2007). 
Thinking about subordinate and minority groups often pivots around the violation of the self-
control ethos, and by associating outgroups with a paucity of self-control, dominant thinking 
transforms the self-control ethos into an instrument of exclusion and derogation. In this study, 
Joffe and Staerklé differentiate between three forms of self-control, related to mind, body and 
destiny:  
Perceived body control refers to values of morality, civility and discipline, thought to underpin an 
orderly and well-behaved society. Concomitantly, lack of body control yields stereotype content 
of immorality, decadence, dirt and ‘uncivilised behaviour’ which threaten the social order. 
Perceived control of the mind relates to the values of competence and rationality which are 
associated with high status positions in society. Lack of such control, in turn, elicits 
representations of incompetence, emotionality and irrationality associated with low status 
positions. Finally, perceived destiny control applies to achievement, self-sustainability and 
entrepreneurship which are seen as essential qualities for the economic development of a society. 
Failure to control one’s destiny generates images of laziness, undeservingness and parasitism (p. 
409). 
 
This analysis of stereotype content as reflecting lacking control on these three dimensions 
accounts for a considerable part of variance of common stereotype content and can be applied to 
most commonly derogated groups. Apart from the people from non-western cultural contexts 
who may be construed by westerners as lacking the essential cultural attributes of self-control and 
individual autonomy (Said, 1978; Staerklé, 2005), the analysis may also cover aspersions 
ascribed to crowds, women, children and mentally ill people. Other instantiations of lacking self-
control are seen in the association of gay men with immorality and promiscuity, obese people 
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with weakness of will power, drug users and smokers with connotations of addiction as well as 
welfare beneficiaries and poor people in general with lacking self-sufficiency and control over 
destiny (Gilens, 1999). 
 
INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND ANTAGONISTIC INTERGROUP RELATIONS 
 
I now wish to extend the analysis of antagonistic intergroup relations to conflict between 
democratic and nondemocratic groups, that is, to a situation of conflict between a value-
conforming and a value-violating group. In such a situation, one could expect that hostile actions 
perpetrated by a group seen as conforming to the value of democracy may be judged as more 
legitimate than those carried out by the counter-normative non democratic group, in particular 
when the conflict opposes antagonistic groups. In the “real” world, this situation is present when 
Western nations engage in hostile military actions against non-Western nations, as was repeatedly 
the case during the last two decades, for example during the first Gulf war in 1991 or in Iraq in 
2003.  
This reasoning gave rise to the “democracy-as-value hypothesis” according to which 
“Democracy provides value to democratic individuals, groups, and institutions, therefore granting 
legitimacy to their actions, whatever that action actually may be.” (Falomir, Staerklé, Pereira & 
Butera, 2012, p. 324). We experimentally tested this prediction in a number of studies in order to 
evidence the social psychological processes responsible for legitimizing conflict between 
democratic and non-democratic groups (e.g., Falomir, Staerklé, Depuiset & Butera, 2005, 2007). 
In order to prevent participants of thinking of specific countries and existing international 
conflicts, we created an experimental paradigm inspired by Sherif’s summer camp studies. Based 
on the assumption that a key component of a democratic organization was the way decisions were 
taken in a group, we operationalised the value of democracy with decision making procedures in 
groups: Democratic groups were described with egalitarian decision making where all members 
of an adolescent group in a summer camp have their say, whereas nondemocratic groups were 
defined by hierarchical decision making where one leader would take decisions and the other 
members would follow. Participants then read an experimental scenario of a conflict about 
perceived mistreatment and resulting retaliation occurring between adolescent groups in a 
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summer camp. In this conflict, the perpetrator and the victim group were described as either 
egalitarian-democratic or as hierarchical-nondemocratic, resulting in four intergroup conflict 
configurations. 
In a first study, we showed that aggressions perpetrated by an egalitarian group against a 
hierarchical group were judged as the least illegitimate, compared to other three configurations 
(Falomir et al., 2005). A similar pattern of results was found with respect to the perceived 
legitimacy of collective punishment: punishing democratic groups for their misdeeds against 
nondemocratic groups was less acceptable than punishment resulting from the other three conflict 
configurations (Falomir et al., 2007). Put otherwise, when democratic groups attack 
nondemocratic groups, people more easily find ways to condone such hostility than when a 
democratic group attacks another democratic group, or when nondemocratic groups initiate 
conflicts. This finding provides support for the democracy-as-value hypothesis, and reveals the 
legitimizing power of social representations of democracy, and of representations associated with 
antagonistic intergroup relations more generally. 
In a more recent study, we extended this paradigm to include public opinion in fictitious 
countries as an additional factor to account for perceived legitimacy of intergroup conflict 
(Falomir et al., 2012). Here, the results showed that when public opinion in a democratic country 
was either perceived (Study 1) or manipulated (Study 2) as being in favour of hostile acts against 
a non-democratic country, the aggression was deemed more acceptable than in any other conflict 
configuration. In particular, public opinion in non-democratic countries did not play any role in 
these justificatory judgements, providing support for the idea described above that nondemocratic 
populations are represented as lacking agency and political decision power. In short, democratic 
public opinion justifies aggression against non-democratic countries, suggesting a powerful 
justificatory function of perceived democratic public opinion when it comes to legitimise military 
aggression and other reprehensible acts. More generally, this line of research demonstrates that 
even today, the value of democracy provides the basis of a powerful and versatile antagonism: 
Democratic legitimacy is fundamentally based on nondemocratic illegitimacy. 
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SOCIAL ORDER REPRESENTATIONS MODEL 
 
The focus on the role of social representations in intergroup relations has led me to attempt to 
formalise how social values and political belief systems intervene in organising social relations. 
The result is a heuristic model called “Social order representations model” (SORM) that 
organises representations of antagonistic intergroup relations into four broad categories, termed 
Moral order, Free Market, Social diversity and Structural inequality. These four conceptions of 
social order determine as many ways of constructing a “true citizen” against its counterpart, since 
each antagonism opposes a positive to a negative stereotype. In this talk, I will only give a short 
overview of the model; more detailed information can be found elsewhere (Scheidegger & 
Staerklé, 2011; Staerklé, 2009; Staerklé, Delay, Gianettoni & Roux, 2007a; Staerklé, Likki & 
Scheidegger, 2012). 
This model assumes that political beliefs and the associated stereotype content dualisms 
are organised as a function of two fundamental criteria: the first one refers to whether the 
representation intervenes in regulating relations within or between groups, and the second one 
differentiates between representations related to belongingness and those associated with social 
position. The crossing of these two polarities gives rise to the four normative models of social 
order (Table 2). 
Within-group regulation is typically enacted to legitimise moral order and free market 
forms of social organisation. It is based on normative differentiation that establishes boundaries 
between norm-conforming, prototypical and norm-violating, non-prototypical individuals. 
Between-group regulation, in turn, is the process through which social diversity and structural 
inequality forms of social order are justified. The process of categorical differentiation creates 
and affirms boundaries between groups (Duckitt, 2001; Kreindler, 2005). 
This distinction between normative and categorical differentiation processes is important 
for a fuller understanding of the nature of intergroup antagonisms: Through normative 
differentiation, antagonisms are understood as the result of wilful individual actions. The 
meaning of normative categories is derived from perceived conformity of actions with important 
ingroup values; the work ethic, for example, is used to oppose lazy and hard-working people, and 
a conservative morality is at the roots of the antagonism between “good” and “bad” citizens. In 
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normative differentiation, boundaries are therefore represented as permeable (anyone can work 
hard if one truly wants to). The process of categorical differentiation, in turn, underlies normative 
beliefs that pit groups defined by ascribed membership against each another. It typically refers to 
“classical” intergroup processes between ethnocultural minorities and majorities (as in 
ethnocentric beliefs) or between subordinate and dominant groups (as in beliefs of social 
dominance). Boundaries are therefore considered as impermeable. 
 
Table 2. Social order representations model (SORM) 
  Belongingness Social position 
  Normative (within-group) differentiation 
  MORAL ORDER FREE MARKET 
Antagonism “Good” & “Bad” “Winners” & “Losers” 
Regulatory principle Conformism Equity principle 
Political belief Authoritarianism Meritocracy 
  Categorical (between-group) differentiation 
  SOCIAL DIVERSITY STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY 
Antagonism Ingroup vs. outgroup Dominants & Subordinates 
Regulatory principle Intergroup differentiation Inequality management 
Political beliefs 
MAJORITY: Ethnocentrism vs. 
MINORITY: Multiculturalism 
DOMINANTS: Social dominance 
vs. SUBORDINATES: 
Egalitarianism 
 
The second dimension opposes, on the one side, representations related to belongingness 
and social identities, and, on the other side, representations associated with social position, social 
hierarchy, and instrumentality. Group representations and stereotype content in the belongingness 
forms of social order (Moral order and Social diversity) rely on non-quantifiable criteria that 
allow for a positive intergroup differentiation such as “morality”, whereas group representations 
in the social position forms of social order (Free market and Structural inequality) are based on 
material and quantifiable attributes. 
Let us now briefly describe the specificities of each of the four resulting cells of social 
order and the social psychological processes associated with it. In the conception of moral order, 
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social order is upheld through representations of morality and conformity (as in conservative 
forms of communitarianism, Etzioni, 1994). Social order is upheld by consensual endorsement of 
conservative values such as morality, self-reliance, and discipline: The good and true citizen is 
the one who best represents “our” values, whereas the one who disrespects and transgresses them, 
with deviant and disorderly behavior, is represented as a “bad” citizen. Typically, this form of 
social order is legitimized with authoritarian modes of thinking, characterized by intolerance of 
deviance and submissiveness to authorities (see Duckitt, 1989). 
The free market conception of social order consists of representations associated with 
competitive motivations, productivity and individual performance. On grounds of economically 
liberal principles, free market thinking assumes that the basic human motivation is self-interest 
(see Miller, 1999). Meritocratic beliefs differentiate lazy “losers” from productive “winners”, and 
individuals are expected to engage in market-based, competitive relations with one another. 
Alleged welfare dependency – the idea that government support makes people lazy and 
irresponsible – is an example of a core belief in the free market conception.  
The conception of social diversity features representations concerning subgroup identities 
in a society, and thereby includes conceptions of cultural diversity and multiculturalism. It relies 
upon ascribed group membership and is based on an a priori distinction between social groups – 
in particular between ethno-cultural groups. This conception is more complex than the 
conceptions of moral order and free market because social order representations of social 
diversity may depict group differences as either positive (as in multicultural thinking and identity 
politics defending rights of particular groups) or as negative (as in racist, nationalist and 
ethnocentric thinking). 
In the final structural inequality conception, representations are structured by perceived 
group-based social hierarchies of status and power. In this conception, antagonisms are defined 
between rather impermeable subordinate and dominant social categories. These categories are 
seen as being in competition with each other: The claims by subordinate groups threaten the well-
being of the dominant groups. As in the social diversity conception, social order representations 
can either portray structural inequalities as legitimate, fair and “normal”, or as illegitimate and 
unfair. In order to justify structural inequality antagonisms, individuals may for example endorse 
beliefs that point to the moral, social, and intellectual superiority of those in privileged positions, 
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or they may see inequality as the illegitimate result of social reproduction and inherited privileges 
and therefore support egalitarian policies destined to correct inequality beliefs. 
Now that you have a general idea about the social order representations model, I want to 
highlight in the remainder of this talk three ways to apply the model, namely opinion formation, 
differential meanings associated with social order concepts, and the historical development of 
conceptions of social order.  
 
OPINION FORMATION: THE EXAMPLE OF MATERIAL VULNERABILITY 
 
In studies on the formation of political attitudes and public opinion, the role of political and 
ideological beliefs has long been recognized. Often, however, studies lack a rationale to link 
opinions to more general belief systems and the social conditions that produce endorsement or 
rejection of these belief systems. The Social order representations model may help in 
conceptualizing these relationships. The basic idea is that objective (e.g., education and income 
level) and subjective (perceived vulnerability) social conditions shape social order 
representations which in turn give rise to more clearly defined positionings towards specific 
social issues, that is, opinions and policy attitudes. We have thus a mediation model in which the 
independent variable is social position, the mediating variables are social order representations 
and the outcome variables are political opinions. In terms of the familiar concepts of anchoring, 
organizing principles and positioning (Doise, Clémence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993), social position 
represents the anchoring variable (understood specifically as social or sociological anchoring), 
while social order representations are analysed as organizing principles of positionings towards 
social issues. This analytic scheme has been applied to account for attitudes towards social 
welfare and government intervention in the Swiss context (Staerklé et al., 2007a) and in 
international comparisons (Staerklé et al., 2012) as well as to examine trust towards political 
institutions from a social representations perspective (Scheidegger & Staerklé, 2011). 
In order to give a concrete example of such an analysis, let us have a look at some results 
of a study based on representative samples of four Swiss cities. This study aimed at evidencing 
two representational pathways resulting from perceived material vulnerability and leading to 
differential attitudes towards disciplinary and social government intervention (Staerklé, Delay, 
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Gianettoni & Roux, 2007b). We carried out a path analysis that treats perceived material 
vulnerability (e.g., “not having enough money to make ends meet”) as an anchoring variable. 
Two measures were used as mediating variables: disorder perception (e.g., “there will be more 
and more civil unrest”) as an indicator of moral order representations and awareness of 
inequality (e.g., “the rich get richer, the poor get poorer”) as an indicator of structural inequality 
representations. Finally, two policy attitudes were used as positioning variables, support for 
disciplinary state intervention (e.g., “strengthen police force in the streets”) and support for 
redistributive (social) government intervention (e.g., “increase taxes for the rich in order to 
decrease inequality”).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The findings (Figure 1) show, first, that perceived material vulnerability has two 
contrasting consequences in terms of representations of social order. On the one hand it increases 
perceptions of a morally corrupt, disorderly society, and on the other hand it strengthens 
awareness of social inequalities. Endorsing these representations has important consequences for 
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Figure 1. Path analysis of two representational consequences of perceived material vulnerability 
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the support of specific roles of government: Individuals who perceive disorder as a result of their 
precarious social position are much more likely to support disciplinary, repressive government 
intervention, whereas individuals who instead have developed a heightened awareness of 
inequality are more likely to support social, redistributive government intervention (while 
opposing at the same time disciplinary government intervention). Moreover, material 
vulnerability has also direct (albeit weaker) effects on these two fundamental policy orientations. 
This study thus illustrates the heuristic value of the social order representations model, as it 
shows how similar social conditions can lead to the endorsement of very different representations 
of social order and of the corresponding policy attitudes. 
 
DIFFERENTIAL MEANINGS OF SOCIAL ORDER CONCEPTS 
 
A second way to apply the Social order representations model is to provide a structured account 
of the differential meanings that can be associated to broad and general concepts related to social 
order. I will exemplify this idea with two examples of such notions, namely immigrants and 
equality. 
Table 3 uses the same structure of the social order representations models as Table 2, but 
shows how stereotypes of immigrants and conceptions of equality vary as a function of the four 
conceptions of social order. When immigrants are represented through the lens of moral order, 
they are likely to be constructed as norm-transgressing group members, as deviant, “non-
adapted” and in case of severe norm violation as immoral, dangerous and criminal group 
members. In this view, immigrants first of all represent a symbolic threat to “moral” ingroup 
values, and they are seen as being individually responsible for this state of affairs. In a free 
market conception, however, the image of immigrants changes: given the principle of normative 
differentiation at work in both moral order and free market conceptions, they are also seen as 
transgressing ingroup norms, but in the case of a free market conception of social order, these 
values are self-reliance and hard work rather than moral values of decent and civilised behaviour. 
As a result, immigrants are constructed as lazy and profiteering, and suspected of being first of all 
motivated to take advantage of the social welfare system. In the social diversity conception, 
immigrants are perceived in a more categorical way determined by their group membership. This 
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is the realm of cultural essentialism whereby entire immigrant groups as constructed as 
“culturally” different and as fundamentally “other” in relation to the host population. In the 
structural inequality conception, entire immigrant groups are constructed as being (legitimately) 
subordinate in relation to the dominant host population, for example in contexts where certain 
ethnic groups occupy low status positions and are exploited by members of the dominant group 
(e.g., newly arrived Mexicans in the U.S.). Overall, this conceptual analysis of immigrant 
stereotypes suggests that negative views of immigrants are anchored in different social order 
representations, which in turn implies that measures to address negative views of immigrants 
need to take into account their representational foundations. 
A similar analysis can be done for the abstract and polysemic concept of “equality”. In a 
moral order conception, equality refers to expected similarity among ingroup members who are 
held to endorse a common set of values and norms. In the free market conception, equality is 
understood as a normative form of fundamental equality between individuals, that is, as equality 
of opportunities: everyone has the same chances to succeed in life and consequently inequalities 
are seen as the outcome of individual differences in motivations and efforts. In the social 
diversity conception, equality refers to a normative principle of intergroup equality in terms of 
equal treatment and procedural justice. This equality principle proscribes unequal and 
discriminatory treatment on behalf of institutions and authorities as a function of social group 
membership. The structural inequality representation, finally, implies a social-democratic view 
of intergroup equality that seeks to correct and therefore to minimise inequality in terms of the 
actual distribution of wealth and material resources.  
 
 
Table 3. Social order representations model applied to immigrant stereotypes and conceptions of equality 
  MORAL ORDER FREE MARKET 
Regulatory principle 
Conformism 
(Assimilation) 
Equity principle 
(Individual responsibility) 
Immigrant stereotype 
Deviant, dangerous, criminal 
immigrants 
Lazy, profiteering immigrants 
Equality conception Ingroup equality (similarity) Equality of opportunities 
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  SOCIAL DIVERSITY STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY 
Regulatory principle 
Intergroup differentiation 
(Cultural essentialism) 
Inequality management 
(Intergroup dominance) 
Immigrant stereotype Immigrant groups as the “Other” Immigrant groups as subordinates 
Equality conception Equality of intergroup treatment Equality of intergroup resources 
 
These two examples illustrate that the social order representations model is useful in 
organising different meanings associated with general categories and concepts which are open to 
debate and interpretation. It thereby provides the conceptual tools to examine how specific 
meanings associated with general notions actually condition the psychological processes at work, 
for example processes of normative and categorical differentiation and the ensuing definition of 
who is a true citizen and who is not. Such an undertaking is in line with a social representations 
approach, since the theory has always emphasised the importance of a proper understanding of 
the relationship between thought content and thought process in a given domain. 
 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL ORDER REPRESENTATIONS 
 
As a last example of application of the model, I would like to mention a more societal analysis of 
the development of broad and widespread representations that structure the sociocultural 
development of contemporary societies. This last example is necessarily very fragmentary and 
incomplete, and is only intended to show the feasibility of a more comprehensive analysis. 
This societal view of the model also highlights the discursive and rhetorical nature of 
social order representations. These representations are disseminated in society through a number 
of communication channels, in particular political discourse selected, relayed, reframed and often 
distorted by mass media. In line with social theorists (e.g., Young, 1999), one can assume that 
contemporary societies are defined by hegemonic representations that attempt to provide 
legitimacy to dominant forms of policy making. Following WW2 and until the late 1960’s, this 
dominant narrative was one of similarity, conformity and consensus, that is, an era of inclusion 
(see also Israel & Tajfel, 1972). The epochal turn in societal representations during the 1960’s is 
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well documented. During the early 1970’s, Western societies witnessed the rise of both a neo-
conservative (moral order) doctrine, based on a punitive vision of dealing with social problems, 
and a neo-liberal (free market) doctrine that promotes the idea of a self-sufficient and self-
interested individual who is responsible for his or her own destiny. While such discourses were 
first put forward by powerful majority groups and as such represent the propagation mode of 
communication, they quickly gave rise to a new hegemonic representation of social exclusion: 
suddenly, it became legitimate to push marginal and minority groups outside of mainstream 
society (Garland, 2001). As a result, social exclusion has become the new “default” 
representation organising Western countries, a new common sense that no longer needs to be 
asserted by majority groups in order to sustain itself and legitimise social order. Exclusion has 
become so commonplace that its principles are disseminated through an undifferentiated 
communication process of diffusion (see Figure 2). 
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
But these attempts to impose hegemonic representations of social order have been met by 
fierce resistance, as epitomised by the various minority movements that have put forward 
alternative representations since the 1960’s. Civil rights protests in the U.S. claim rights for 
Blacks, and feminist movements denounce a male-centred social order; both put forward claims 
of recognition of their respective social categories. Environmental movements criticize the 
ideological bases of growth-oriented capitalism, homosexuals seek rights for alternative forms of 
sexuality and close relationships, and the student movements of the late 1960’s condemn the 
conformism and the authoritarianism of the post-war period. Eventually, many of these early 
propaganda minority claims have been taken up by mainstream society, and have thereby 
become emancipated representations, defended not only by minorities, but also by majority 
movements. This is certainly the case for the politics of recognition that express a far greater 
awareness and sensitivity for the needs and specificities of various minority and subordinate 
groups than was the case in earlier decades, but also for “green” environment movements that 
have become part of standard political programmes of all major political parties. More recent 
developments, starting in the late 1990’s, finally, show a powerful backlash against the 
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hegemony of the neo-liberal free market conception of social order. Minority movements of anti-
neoliberalism and anti-globalisation have rippled through many countries in the last decade, 
proposing again alternative forms of social order. If anything, a thorough analysis of these 
developments demonstrates the close relationship between the two major theoretical frameworks 
put forward by Serge Moscovici, social representations theory and minority influence theory (see 
Staerklé, 2013).  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
In this talk, I wanted to highlight the idea of antagonistic intergroup relations. I have done so by 
presenting an ongoing research programme on representations of democratic and nondemocratic 
countries, and on the perceived legitimacy of conflict between democratic-egalitarian and 
nondemocratic-hierarchical groups. The second part of my talk featured the social order 
representations model and its possible applications. This model tries to formalise the regulatory 
principles and the representational processes underlying different types of social antagonisms.  
To conclude, I wish to highlight the social functions of intergroup antagonisms. These 
antagonisms enhance ingroup similarity, highlight the positive features of the ingroup by 
contrasting them to the negative ones of the outgroup, and polarise, essentialise and 
instrumentalise intergroup differences by defining relevant dimensions of comparison between 
antagonistic categories. 
With respect to the theory of social representations, this approach places the group at the 
centre of representational processes, as objectified objects of representation and as instances of 
struggles of classification and categorisation. It also establishes links with more traditional 
domains of intergroup psychology, in particular social identity, stereotype content and prejudice.  
By integrating social dynamics centred on both similarity and difference between 
individuals and groups, this approach could help to further our understanding of social change 
and social stability, a dual problem that has preoccupied and eluded social psychologists for 
decades. In order to do so, it is necessary to forge a clear conceptual and operational relationship 
between processes of intergroup influence on the one hand, and different types of social 
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representations on the other. This seems to be a promising avenue to tackle issues of diversity, 
pluralism and inequality which are at the heart of contemporary societies. 
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